

12.1 C AEAS 4729T Gr & 12.2 HMCS RACCOON (Armed yacht)

DUIKBOOT gibt:

Nummer	Datum	Zeit	Nr.	Bootnr.	Flottille	Kommandant	Pa	Ereignis (FST)	Feit	Referentie	Quadrat
39925	06.09.1942	22u00	1	U165	10	HOFFMANN Eberhard (25)	1	Angriff auf Geleitzug	QS33	C AEAS 4729T Gr BA38 +	BA38
39926	06.09.1942	24u00	2	U165	10	HOFFMANN Eberhard (25)	1	Angriff auf Geleitzug	QS33	Pb HMCS RACCOON 358T BA38 +	BA38

"Lloyd's War Losses" (Band I, Seite 530) meldet die AEAS wurde von ein Uboot versenkt am 7/09/42, die RACCOON am 29/09/42, beide ohne Zeitangabe, aber Lloyd's macht – es sei anders angegeben – Angaben auf Basis von GMT-Zeiten.

<https://uboot.net/allies/merchants/ship/2128.html> macht keine detaillierte Zeitangaben zur Versenkung.

Notes on event During the night of 6/7 Sep 1942, U-165 attacked convoy QS-33 in the St. Lawrence river and reported the sinking of three ships with 19.000 tons. In fact, the **Aeas** and **HMCS Raccoon** were hit and sunk.

https://www.historisches-marinearchiv.de/projekte/ass/ausgabe.php?where_value=2459&lang=1 gibt für AEAS sowohl bei Angriffs- als Beobachtungsdatum dem 06/09/42, und als Beobachtungszeit 22:00. RACCOON am 07/09/42. ohne Zeit.

Auf www.fold3.com befinden sich -zig Admiralty War Diaries, aber ich fand keine digitalisierte Version der sich auf die erste Wochen von September 1942 bezieht.

KTB BdU für den 06/09/42 meldet:

5) U 165 sighted a convoy of 5 steamers, course 70°, 7 knots in BA 3836. She attacked and scored 2 hits each on 3 steamers totaling 19,000 GRT. Sinking not seen but probable.

"No higher Purpose" (W.A.Douglas et all) meldet:

The Battle of the St Lawrence

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after 2100, and it soon became clear that they had not succeeded in suppressing *U 165*. At 2300, not long after the convoy had passed Cap Chat, Hoffman attacked. The Greek freighter *Aeas*, bound for the United Kingdom with Canadian lumber and steel, suffered two heavy explosions and sank in five minutes.⁸⁷ Starshell and an asdic search turned up nothing. At 0210 on 7 September the escorts heard what sounded like depth-charge explosions from the direction of *Raccoon's* place in the screen. Since the yacht did not have radio-telephone, the only secure and convenient method of communication, *Raccoon* would have closed to flash a light signal only if something significant had turned up, and so the other escorts did not think it unusual when they heard nothing more. In fact, the explosions almost certainly marked the destruction of the yacht by torpedoes from *U 165*; none of the thirty-five men on board survived.⁸⁸

Early in the morning of 7 September Hoffman transmitted a report of his attack. Hartwig in *U 517* had just reached the Cap Chat coast. He reported that...

87. All but two of thirty-one on board survived. *Lloyd's War Losses* I, 530; *U 165*, KTB, 7 Sep., 1942

88. COAC to COMINCH, "Report of Submarine Attack on Convoy QS 33," 23 Nov. 1942, NAC, RG 24, 4027, NSS 1062-13-19, pt 1, Includes ROPS of all of the escorts and analyses by staff; SO (Bases and Rents), NSHQ, "HMCS Raccoon. Movements between Sep. 3 and Sep. 7 1942," 12 Sep. 1942, DHH, DOD, "Weekly Operational Summaries," 1942; "Loss of HMCS Raccoon (Armed Yacht)," 13 Sep. 1952, DHH, 81/520/8280 QS 33; *U 165*, KTB, 7 Sep. 1942

"U-boats against Canada" (Michael L.Hadley) bringt eine detailliertere Beschreibung des Geschehens:

Kapitänleutnant Hartwig had meanwhile scouted to within a 32-mile arc south of Heath Point, Anticosti, when he decided to cross the Gulf to the Gaspé Peninsula. At 1000 hours on 7 September he intercepted Hoffmann's signal regarding convoy movement within the broad naval quadrant BA 36, whose western and eastern perimeters enclosed territory from Les Méchins to Gros Mornes. This may have been the same signal to German Naval Headquarters claiming the sinking of two vessels west of Les Méchins.⁷ Hartwig correctly assumed that the convoy would likely tuck in close to the Gaspé coast and that his best position would therefore be as close inshore as possible. By mid morning he waited off Pointe à la Frégate to join the battle for QS-33.

For many hours prior to this signal, Hoffmann's U-165 had been tracking the Quebec-Sydney convoy QS-33. Consisting of eight merchant ships in two columns, it passed Pointe au Père east of Rimouski at 1630 GMT, escorted by a Gulf Escort Force in the following screening positions: the Senior Officer in the corvette HMCS *Arrowhead*, and the Bangor minesweeper HMCS *Truro* maintained station to port and starboard respectively of the lead merchantmen; the Fairmile HMCML Q-083 sailed in the van, HMCML Q-065 stationed dead astern of the convoy with the Armed Yacht HMCS *Raccoon* one-half mile off her port quarter. U-165 attacked the convoy in reduced visibility off Cap Chat in the early hours of 7 September 1942 and sank the 2988-ton Greek vessel *Aeas* 5 miles northwest of Cap Chat at 0205 GMT.⁸ HMCS *Arrowhead* illuminated with star shell, which cast a cone of light as far astern as *Raccoon's* lonely station off the convoy's port quarter, where she was seen – by all accounts

– for the last time. *Arrowhead* completed her A/S search, picked up twenty-nine survivors of the *Aeas*, and returned to her station. Survivors were landed at Gaspé, two crew were missing. Not completely convinced of a U-boat's presence, Canadian authorities attributed the loss of *Aeas* either to "a torpedo or to an internal explosive." Two explosions quite likely confused the issue: the first from Hoffmann's torpedo, and the second 15 minutes later by a severe boiler explosion that sent her to the bottom. The loss of HMCS *Raccoon* (ex *Halongia*) was both mysterious and macabre.⁹

According to the monthly report of the Staff Officer Operations in Halifax, then LCdr H.S. Rayner, RCN, HMCS *Raccoon* had reported at 0240 GMT on 3 September, just minutes after the sinking of the SS *Aeas*, that she was being attacked by torpedoes. One apparently passed 25 feet ahead of her and the other directly beneath, forward of the bridge. She then seems to have run up the track for 6000 yards dropping depth charges, but obtained no contact. Around 0500 GMT, almost three hours

after the loss of *Aeas*, HMCS *Arrowhead* temporarily left station to sweep ahead of the convoy. At 0512 hours off Martin River Light, several ships heard two explosions in rapid succession followed by a short blast of a ship's whistle. Despite the darkness, witnesses claimed to have seen two columns of water off the convoy's port quarter. As this was *Raccoon's* station, it was generally assumed that she had "contacted the night's prowler and was executing a depth charge attack."¹⁰

Arrowhead swept down the port side of the convoy to a point well astern of *Raccoon's* assigned station, but reported neither sightings nor contacts. German records, based on receipted signals from U-165, indicated that Hoffmann had sunk the *Raccoon*.¹¹ But in the convoy and screening forces no one assumed that the yacht had been destroyed. Seven hours after her demise, NOIC Gaspé radioed *Raccoon* to report her position, course, and speed. She was presumed lost with all hands when no word was received. Gradually some details emerged. On 21 September a life-jacket marked with the yacht's pre-war name *Halongia*, together with small pieces of wreckage, was washed up on the west side of Anticosti Island near Ellis Bay. Four weeks after the sinking a patrol found the very badly decomposed body of Slt R.H. McConnell, the only body from *Raccoon* ever found. It was buried at sea with full honours. Five days later *Raccoon's* motor boat was found at Thunder River, then more flotsam and part of the yacht's bridge. The Board of Inquiry concluded that she had sunk as a result of "direct hits by one or more torpedoes" while conducting a depth-charge attack. In the absence of Hoffmann's log, we will never know.

Hadley's Fußnoten 7-10:

- 7 DHIST: 1650/U-517. Rohwer's letter to DND of 9 May 1964 on file.
- 8 EAC, A/S, September 1942, 6, placed sinking at 0210 GMT in position 49° 10' N, 66° 50' W near Cap Chat. EAC claimed thirty-nine survivors and two killed. COAC, Operations, and Records of SOMC/Trade include HMCS *Vegreville* among escorts.
- 9 For a full account of what Hugh Keenleyside termed "The Great Yacht Plot" (*Weekend Magazine*, 23 March 1974), see McKee, *The Armed Yachts of Canada*.
- 10 COAC to C-in-C U.S. Fleet, "Analysis of U/Boat Attack on Convoy Q 33," 23 November 1942 (DHIST: 81/520/8280, box 8, QS 33). Explosions seem to have occurred at 49° 12' N, 66° 24' W.
- 11 Rohwer, *Seekrieg*, 276. Also Rohwer, *Axis Submarine Successes*, 12.

U165 meldet die Angriffe auf die AEAS und HMCS RACCOON in **BA3836** (siehe KTB BdU). Der Eastern Air Command (siehe Ref. '8' bei Hadley) in sein A/S Bericht für September 1942 dokumentiert die Torpedierung der Dampfer **AEAS am 07/09/42** um 0210GMT (=2210 am 06/09/42 lokaler Zeit, = **0410 DSZ am 07/09/42**) in 49°10'N 66°50'W (= BA3911) bei CapChat (Cap Chat liegt selber in 49°05'59.3"N 66°41'16.2"W=BA3915).


Die Torpedierung von **HMCS RACCOON** wäre laut Hadley **am 07/09/42** um 0512GMT (=0112 lokaler Zeit, = **0712 DSZ um 07/09/42**) bei das Martin River Light ('La Martre' lighthouse = 49°12'26.1"N 66°10'18.3"W = nahe **BA3688**). **Diese Angaben kommen in DUKBOOT.**

12.3 Zs CARMEN 84T Dom


Der Dominikanische Segler CARMEN steht in DUKBOOT ohne Zeit der Versenkung.

5839	11.07.1942	-	1	U166	10	KUHLMANN Hans-Günther	2	Angriff auf Einzelfahrer	Zs CARMEN 84T Dom ED11 +	ED11
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Die Admiralty War Diaries (fold3.com, micro serial number K-6-C, Seite 789) melden für den 12/07/42



und für den 13/07/42 (Seite 824), gibt die Versenkungsposition als 1943N 7012W (=DN9571):



Ein Bericht der Überlebenden der CARMEN steht bei [chrome-extension://oemmndcblboiebfnladdacbfmadadm/https://ericwiberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CARMEN-Survivors-Statements.pdf](https://ericwiberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CARMEN-Survivors-Statements.pdf) und gibt an die Versenkung mit Artilleriefeuer fand statt am 11/07/42 um 1700Z = 1900DSZ (U-Zeit). Diesem Bericht erwähnt dass ein gemeldeter Versenkungsdatum von 13/07/42 falsch ist, und korrigiert wurde in 11/07/42. Und er gibt 2 Positionen: 1. die gleiche wie im AWD und eine 2. 1946N-7031W (=DN9491).

DUKBOOT erhielt als Versenkungsdatum den 11/07/42 und als -Zeit **1900 (DSZ)**.


Die Versenkungsposition wurde korrigiert **ED11 => DN9571** (= wir behalten die Adm War Diary-Position bei).

12.4 C ONEIDA 2309T US


Es fehlt eine Versenkungszeit in DUKBOOT:

5840	13.07.1942	-	1	U166	10	KUHLMANN Hans-Günther	2	Angriff auf Einzelfahrer	C ONEIDA 2309T US DN73 +	DN73
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Die Admiralty War Diaries (fold3.com, micro serial number K-6-C, Seite 891) melden für den 15/07/42



und für den 16/07/42 (Seite 924)



"Lloyd's War Losses" (Band I, Seite 491) gibt dieselbe geographische Position 2017N-7406W (=DN7634) der Versenkung.

[chrome-extension://oemmndcblboiebfnladdacbfmadadm/https://ericwiberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ONEIDA-Survivors-Statements.pdf](https://ericwiberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ONEIDA-Survivors-Statements.pdf) bringt ein Bericht vom Master der ONEIDA mit (u.a.) die Information:

13	Date and time of attack.....	Date	7/13/42	Time	1210
14	Position.....	Latitude	20°17'N	Longitude	74°06'W
15	Nature of attack (Give data).....	TORPEDO			
16	Number of hits.....	1			

Browning gibt die gleiche Versenkungsposition und als (lokaler) Zeit 1210.

Die Versenkungsstelle liegt in eine Zeitzone "-5", die Umsetzung der lokaler Zeit 1210 => 1710 GMT = 1910 DSZ ergibt einen Unterschied von 1 Stunde mit die Zeiten wie vermerkt im AWD und bei uboat.net. Da rechnet man mit 4 Stunden Unterschied zwischen lokaler und GMT Zeit...??

DUIKBOOT erhält als Angriffszeit 1910 DSZ (gemäß AWD) und als -Position DN7634.

12.5 Tr GERTRUDE 16T US

Auch hier fehlt eine Versenkungszeit in DUIKBOOT:

5841	16.07.1942	-	1	U166	10	KUHLMANN Hans-Günther	2	Angriff auf Einzelfahrer	Tr GERTRUDE 16T US DM43 +	DM43
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Erste (und einige) Meldung in die Admiralty War Diaries ist am 20/07/42 (fold3.com, micro serial number K-6-C, Seite 1049):

Sub attack and sighting summary. TACHIRA torpedoed and sunk 18.15 N. 81.45 W. 2145Z/12. Fishing trawler GERTRUDE attacked 23.32 N. 82 W. 0830Z/16. Schooner GLACIER

2332N 8200W = DM4366 (NO/Havana), dies ist eine annähernde Position!

<chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbfdmadadm/https://ericwiberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GERTRUDE-Survivors-Statements.pdf> bringt ein Bericht der Überlebenden mit die Angaben der Fischkutter wurde um 0430EWT (Eastern War Time, 0430EWT = 0830GMT = 1030DSZ), die Besatzung erhielt gleich den Befehl das Boot zu verlassen (in ein 14ft Rettungsboot), und etwa 1 Stunde später (0530EWT = 0930GMT = 1130DSZ) hörte die fliehende Besatzung eine Explosion (Master meinte es war eine Sprengladung) und vermutet ihre GERTRUDE wurde versenkt.

Es gibt leicht abweichende Zeiten in die unterschiedliche Dokumenten auf ericwiberg's Webseite.

In DUIKBOOT ergänzen wir QUAD zu DM4366 mit der Verweis P* (Position = annähernd), ZEIT = 1030DSZ anhalten vom Fischkutter, und Versenkung 1 Stunde später mit Sprengladung oder 1 Artilleriegranate.

12.6 C ROBERT E.LEE 5184T US (ein em längerem Bericht, enthält auch Angaben zur Versenkung U166)

DUIKBOOT gibt:

5843	30.07.1942	-	1	U166	10	KUHLMANN Hans-Günther	2	Angriff auf Einzelfahrer	C ROBERT E.LEE 5184T US DB71 +	DB71
5844	30.07.1942	-	2	U166	10	KUHLMANN Hans-Günther	2	versenkt durch Wasserbomben (Kriegsschiff)	Golf Mexico, in DB71, Pb USS PC566, 52 doden, TV	DB71

Es fehlt eine Zeit im Satz zur Versenkung der ROBERT E.LEE, und dieser Zeit wurde auch eine Andeutung geben wann U166 versenkt wurde vom Pb PC566. Pb PC566 war Geleitschiff zur ROBERT E.LEE.

Die Admiralty War Diaries (fold3.com, micro serial number K-7-C, Seite 233) bringen für den 31/07/42...

S/M Attack and sighting Summary. ROBERT E.LEE torpedoed and sunk 28.40 N. 88.42.W. 2142Z/30. S/M reported attacked approx. 10.57 N. 60.47 W. 1435Z/29. Plane attacks S/M 61.45. N. 13.15. W. 0623Z/30. Surface craft attacks S/M

2840N-8842W = DA9386, 2142Z = 2342DSZ. "Lloyd's War Losses" (Bd.I, S.499) gibt dieselbe Versenkungsposition.

Und auf Seite 234:

America & West Indies - Contd.
ROBERT E LEE. BARBACENA. Cannav Serial 31. ROBERT E LEE U.S. torpedoed sunk 30/7 028° 40' N. 088° 42' W. 4 dead 19 missing, 381 rescued. Ship was escorted.

Sinking of the SS ROBERT E. LEE: At 1742 EWT, the SS ROBERT E. LEE, carrying 266 passengers, and escorted by the PC-566, was torpedoed and sunk at Lat. 28° 40' N., Long. 88° 42' W., about 35 to 40 miles off Southwest Pass. She was bound from Key West to New Orleans via Tampa. (Note: the ROBERT E. LEE was a ship of 5184 tons, 375.5 feet long, of 54 foot beam, and of 29.7 foot draft. Her speed was 16 knots, and she was built in 1924 by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., for the Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc., of New York.)

At 0630 EWT, a PBY from Pensacola departed to provide her with air coverage until dark, but was unable, despite an all-day search to locate her. As late as 1600 EWT, the PBY reported in that she had not yet located the R. E. LEE, but would continue search in still another sector. It was assumed that the R. E. LEE would follow the coastal route, in accordance with the routing instructions that have been in effect for several weeks.

At 1811 EWT, the PC-566, escort of the torpedoed vessel, advised that the R. E. LEE was sunk, that survivors were on life rafts, and requested plane coverage while she performed rescue service.

Plane coverage had already been provided. About 1810 EWT, an A-29 from New Orleans was sent to the scene and an OS2U plane from Biloxi. The Biloxi plane arrived at 1822 EWT and reported seven boats and rafts filled with survivors.

Notiz: 1742 EWT = 1742 Eastern War Time = 2142 GMT = 2342 DSZ

These planes were augmented shortly thereafter by two PBY'S from Pensacola. One of these departed at 1830 EWT, to remain at the scene of action until 2000 EWT; the other departed 1900 EWT, to return at 2200 EWT. This brought to four the number of planes sent to cover

und geht weiter auf Seite 352

Sinking of SS ROBERT E. LEE (continued): and search the scene of sinking and rescue.

In addition to the rescue ship, the PC-566, two other surface craft were immediately ordered to the area for intensive anti-submarine activity. They are; The SC-519, out of Burwood (some 35 to 40 miles distant); and the CGC ONYX, from patrol between Southwest Pass and Ship Shoal. This brought to three the number of surface craft engaged.

When informed of the sinking, COMGULFSEAFRON immediately issued a War Warning, notified COMINCH, sent out the above air craft, and ordered COM 8 to send all available craft to the vicinity.

Die Seiten 357 – 359 geben im Bericht vom CO PC566.

3. The voyage was without event and no contact was established until 1637 Roger on July 30, 1942, in Lat. 28° 37' north Long. 88-20 west. At this time this ship was steaming about 800 to 1000 yards ahead of the Robert E. Lee and about 10 degrees on her port bow, conducting sound search which developed no sound contacts.

4. The first indication of the presence of any submarine was the apparent torpedo wake about 150 yards on the starboard bow of the Robert E. Lee. The torpedo wake was not seen in sufficient time by the Robert E. Lee to make any effort to avoid it, as no noticeable effort was made to maneuver the ship.

Notiz: 1637 Roger (timezone 'R') => GMT = R+5 = (1637+5)= 2137Z = 2337 DSZ

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5. Seeing the torpedo wake, general quarters was immediately sounded, rudder put over to the right, heading the ship in the general direction the submarine would probably be. A careful sound search ahead was ordered.

6. A terrific explosion was heard as the Robert E. Lee was hit, and apparently she was hit well astern about 75 to 100 feet from the stern on the starboard side, as that is where the explosion apparently occurred and she settled rapidly by the stern, her bow coming out of the sea.

7. Making our attack on the submarine the first indication of her location was her wake as she appeared to be quite near the surface. Very shortly after seeing this wake, the periscope appeared, being probably three feet out of the water and moving to the right across our bow and toward the SS Robert E. Lee.

8. This ship was conned toward the periscope which was moving at probably three or four knots across our bow. An effort was made to keep the periscope a little on our starboard bow as it was believed that the submarine was watching the sinking of the SS Robert E. Lee and was not aware of our presence upon her starboard quarter.

9. The first sound contact was established at about 260 yards slightly on the starboard which was the position of the periscope. At about this time the periscope submerged but the submarine wake could still be observed and sound contact was maintained to about 120 yards.

10. Upon the loss of the sound contact the ship was brought to the right still following the wake and when directly over the estimated position of the submarine a five charge pattern of depth charges was laid. The first charge from the starboard rack was 250 feet, second charge from the port rack was 100 feet, and at the same time two "K" guns were fired set at 150 feet, and the final charge was laid from the starboard rack at 250 feet.

11. Upon completion of the attack the course was steadied for 1000 yards and course reversed in an effort to establish a second contact. During this run out to come around for a second attack I had the first opportunity to observe the SS Robert E. Lee since she was hit, and discovered that she had disappeared from sight with only life boats and life rafts and debris marking the spot where she was hit. It is my estimation that she sank in five minutes or slightly less.

12. On returning toward the position of the first attack, sound contact was again established about ten degrees off port bow and about 360 yards ahead. This contact was maintained to about 200 yards and the ship was brought to the left over the estimated

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position of the submarine and a second depth charge pattern of five depth charges were fired.

13. Upon completion of this attack the ship was headed along the apparent course of the submarine for about 100 yards, course reversed in an effort to again establish contact, but no contact could be established on this run.

14. At about this time the first plane appeared in response to the contact report sent by this ship and was instructed to aid in the search for the submarine. We then made another complete search over the area that the submarine had been sighted in, but established no sound contact. Upon completion of this run we made a careful sound search around the area in which the survivors were adrift, during which time their condition was studied through binoculars. Upon completing this sound search and investigation it was determined that all survivors were either in life boats or life rafts. At this time a second plane arrived joining in the search and it was my opinion that it was now relatively safe to close in toward the survivors to commence rescue operations, as the submarine was either sunk or at least temporarily in no condition to attack and we were then supported by two planes making a careful search of the entire area.

15. The area of the attack developed a large oil slick at least 200 feet in diameter, and the oil appeared to be a slick of light clean oil which gave a brownish gray tint to the very deep blue water which was over 1000 fathoms in depth. This oil had a definite odor of diesel oil, but no debris was noticed in the area in which the submarine attacked.

16. While I cannot positively state that the submarine was sunk, it is my opinion based on the definiteness of the attack as to the submarine's position when firing depth charges which was confirmed by sound search and sight that the submarine was sunk or so mortally wounded that she would never return to her base.

17. At 1750 Roger the sound search had been completed and the ship stood in toward the life boats farthest from the Robert E. Lee's debris and we began rescue operations. The other boats rowed toward us and passengers were taken aboard on the basis of injuries. To the best of my knowledge there were only 2 women and 2 children among the survivors and these were taken aboard as soon as possible. As the injured were brought aboard they were placed on deck on mattresses and blankets and attended to by the pharmacist mate. About 10 or 12 uninjured men were directed to remain in each boat and to search through the area for life rafts and rescue survivors, which they did.

Wir notieren für DUKBOOT aus dem Bericht der CO PC566:

ROBERT E. LEE wurde torpediert am 30/07/42 um 1637 Roger = 2137 GMT = 2337 DSZ.

PC566 führte unmittelbar nach die Torpedierung einen ersten Angriff auf das Uboot mit 5 Wasserbomben.

Vor PC566 einen weiteren Angriff mit 5 Wasserbomben fuhr war der Dampfer bereits gesunken (geschätzt innerhalb 5 Min). Es ist daher an zu nehmen der 2. Wasserbombenangriff von PC566 erfolgte noch vor 1700 Roger, oder vor 2200 GMT, d.h. noch vor 2400 DSZ am 30/07/42.

PC566 beendete seine Suche nach dem Uboot um 1750 Roger = 2250 GMT (30/07/42) = 0050 DSZ (01/08/42).

<https://catalog.archives.gov/id/133971119> - COMGULFSEAFRON-War Diary, 8/1-31/42 (Enc A) - bringt für den 01/08/42 (Seite 9) noch die Meldung:

(1) ROBERT E. LEE Sinking: Further notes: Latest figures show that the ROBERT E. LEE sank with 404 passengers and crew aboard. There are four known dead, twenty-one missing, and 379 survivors. Of the last mentioned 225 are Americans, 35 are British, 56 are Norwegian, 21 are Canadianian, 25 are Filipinos, 2 are Brazilian, two are Swedish, two are Danish, three are Irish, and one is Panamanian. All confidential documents sank with the ship.

U171 operierte im gleichem Seeräum wie U166, aber U171 kehrte Heim von seiner Feindfahrt und meldete keinen Angriff auf einem Dampfer am 30/07/42, und meldete auch nicht das Boot wurde angegriffen von ein Geleitschiff an diesem Tag.

Das Wrack von U166 wurde gefunden, unweit vom Wrack der ROBERT E.LEE.

Es gibt kein Zweifel U166 torpedierte die ROBERT E.LEE und wurde kurz danach selbst versenkt von PC566.

12.7 C MOLLY PITCHER 7200T US

Heute in DUIKBOOT:

Nummer	Datum	Zeit	Nr.	Bootnr.	Flottille	Kommandant	Pa	Ursprung (FST)	Feit	Referentie	Quadrat
5854	17.03.1943	-	1	U167	10	STURM Kurt	2	Angriff auf Geleitzug	UGS6	C MOLLY PITCHER 7200T US CF55 x (+door U521)	CF55
12893	18.03.1943	05u49	1	U521	2	BARGSTEN 'Klaus'	2	Angriff auf Nachzügler	UGS6 - 1t	C MOLLY PITCHER 7200T US CF56 + (x door U167)	CF56

KTB BdU für den 17/03/43

U 167 torpedoed a freighter of 8,000 GRT in CF 5592 at 2034 and heard sinking noises.

Admiralty War Diaries Für den 17/03/43 (fold3.com, micro serial number K-4-D, Seite 990):

North Atlantic.
Convoy U.G.S. 6 attacked. 5 SS.MOLLY PITCHER in Convoy U.G.S.6 was torpedoed today in 38.21 N. 19.54 W. (about 250 miles N.E. of San Miguel, Azores.)

3821N-1954W = CF5833 (nur etwa 20 Seemeilen von die Position CF5592 im KTB BdU).

Der War Diary von der Zerstörer USS CHAMPLIN für den 17. und 18.März 1943 ist vorhanden bei

https://catalog.archives.gov/search?q=*&f.ancestorNalds=367&sort=naldSort%20asc&tabType=online&rows=100 auf <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/134144135>, Seite 25 und folgende) und meldet für den 17/03/43:

1000 Set all clocks ahead one hour to zone zero time.
R. Vaughan

1200 - 1600
Steaming as before 1200 position Lat 38° 25' N Long. 21° 25' W
Z. Davis Jr.

1600 - 2000
Steaming as before. 1615 Convoy changed course to 067° T.
1615 Heard hydrophone effect of propellers. Investigation gave
no contacts. 1640 USS Trippe left station to make
sweep. Champlin moved up in screen to cover Trippe's
sector. 1645 Convoy changed course to 032° T. 1715 Convoy changed
course to 067° T. 1750 Trippe returned to station. 1815
SC Radar contact bearing 1100° T range 26 miles. 1820 sighted
and identified SC contact as PBV assigned to screen USS G.
1845 Convoy changed course to 102° T. 1936 PBV dropped
two identification flares. 1941 Many ships in convoy
firing into water in center of convoy. 1942. SS. Molly
Pitcher, No. 82, torpedoed. Reports to General Quarters.
Changed speed to 13 knots, course to 330° T to screen
rescue vessel. 1948 Manovering on various courses.
R. Vaughan

Im markierten Ausschnitt: "1942 SS MOLLY PITCHER, no. 82, torpedoed."

Zone description: 0 = GMT (die Uhren wurden versetzt um 1000 – siehe erstem Satz im obigen printscreen).
1942 GMT = 2042 MEZ, fast identisch mit der Angriffszeit 2034 im KTB BdU. (MEZ = U-Zeit bis 29 März 1943).

War Diary USS CHAMPLIN für den 18/03843 meldet:

0000 - 0400
Steaming as before, sound screening S.S. Molly Pitcher
which has been torpedoed and is sinking slowly. Also
with rescue vessel and U.S.S. Rowan, which ships are
picking up survivors. This ship about 3.5 miles astern
of convoy, all hands at general quarters. 0009 U.S.S.
Rowan and rescue vessel returning to convoy with
survivors, this ship remaining in vicinity to destroy
stricken vessel. 0024 fired first Torpedo at S.S.
Molly Pitcher, results undetermined. 0039 fired second
Torpedo, results undetermined. 0100 picked up one
survivor from water, searching for others. 0223 fired
third Torpedo at stricken vessel, Torpedo seen to strike
just aft of the bridge. 0226 secured from general
quarters, all regular condition watch. 0230 changed
speed to 20 knots, steaming to cover via 0200.

Der Zerstörer USS CHAMPLIN feuerte noch 3 Torpedos am 18/03/43 auf das langsam sinkende Wrack der MOLLY PITCHER (0024, 0039 und 0223 GMT), angeblich 3 Treffer aber ohne viel sichtbarer Erfolg.

KTB BdU 17/03/43:

U 167 torpedoed a freighter of 8,000 GRT in CF 5592 at 2034 and heard sinking noises. U 521 sank a stationary freighter of 7,000 GRT at 0600 in square CF 5675.

https://www.historisches-marinearchiv.de/projekte/ass/ausgabe.php?where_value=3235&lang=1 bringt die Torpedo-Schußmeldung die angibt U521 feuerte einem Torpedo auf einen gestoppt liegenden Havaristen in CF5675 am 18/03/49 um 0549 (MEZ) der in 2 bricht, beide Teile sinken nach etwa 8 Minuten. Auch das KTB U521 bringt diese Angaben.

In DUKBOOT erhalten die Sätze zu die MOLLY PITCHER eine ZEIT, eine vollständigere Positionsangabe, und es wird erwähnt auch der Zerstörer USS CHAMPLIN feuerte 3 Torpedos auf das treibende Wrack vom Dampfer.


12.8 C LAGOSIAN 5449T Br

In DUKBOOT:

5856	28.03.1943	11u50	2	U167	10	STURM Kurt	2	Angriff auf Geleitzug	RS3 -T*	C LAGOSIAN 5449T Br DU25	DU25
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Das KTB BdU für den 28/03/43 meldet: U167 sank a freighter of 6,500 GRT at 1247

Die Admiralty War Diaries für den 28/03/43 (fold3.com, micro serial number K-5-D, Seite 256) geben:



"Lloyd's War Losses" (Bd.I, S.651) gibt dieselbe Versenkungstelle: 2535N-1543W (= DU2529).

Am 28/03/43 Uboote verwendete, MEZ-Zeiten.

Die Admiralty War Diaries geben als Zeit 1150Z (GMT). Angriffszeit ist GMT+1 = 1250 MEZ.


In DUKBOOT wurden Angriffsposition und -Zeit korrigiert.

12.9 C HAICHING 2183T Br

In DUKBOOT, ohne Zeit:


Nummer	Datum	Zeit	Nr.	Bootnr.	Flottille	Kommandant	Pa	Ereignis (FST)	Feit	Referentie	Quadrat
5877	02.10.1943	-	1	U168	33	PICH Helmuth	2	Angriff auf Einzelfahrer		C HAICHING 2183T Br MH77 +	MH77

Admiralty War Diaries für 02/10/43 (fold3.com, micro serial number K-18-D, Seite 41):



1846N-7155E = MH7681 (Bem.: KTB BdU – siehe weiter unten - gibt nur 'versenkt am 02/10/43', ohne Zeit und Position).

für 03/10/43, Seite 106



Als 0650 = lokaler Zeit (71°Ost = Zone -5), dann Torpedierung am 0150 Z = 0350 DSZ.

12.10 Sechs kleine Segelschiffen

KTB BdU gibt für den 16/10/43:

- 3) U 168 reports: On 29 and 30.9. no targets in Bombay Harbor. During the day only a few ships were observed through the periscope. Heavy traffic of sailing vessels in all directions. On the way to Mombassa and the gulf of Aden for three days sighted only sailing vessels, of which 6 were sunk by artillery in MH 7743. A 4,000 GRT cargo ship sunk on 2.10. No surface patrol, on 5.10. heavy 2-engined air patrol by day only. New area of operation = Gulf of Oman on 15.10 a four and a two salvo missed on convoy, heading 310°, speed 12 knots. Additionally, two individual misses on a large tanker, boat assumed Eto ran slow, because firing data was exact. In Gulf of Oman confused sea – single-engine air patrol by day over MF 21.


Das Datum der Versenkung der 6 Segelschiffe ist unklar.

Die Admiralty War Diaries machen (wenigsten bis zum 10/10/43, inkl.) keine Angaben zu die Versenkung von diese (wahrscheinlich sehr) kleine Boote.

Bemerkenswert ist, das KTB BdU gibt an U168 fand keine Ziele im Hafen von Bombay Ende September. Gleichzeitig gibt das KTB BdU als Position U168 für den 29/09/43 MS44 (= etwa 360 Seemeilen Südwestlich von Bombay) und am 30/09/43 MS14 (noch immer etwa 225 Seemeilen Südwestlich von Bombay)...Beide Positionen werden angegeben als wirkliche Positionen (keine geschätzte oder berechnete Positionen).

12.11 T EL SEGUNDO 3664T Pt

Während der Suche nach einen Anhaltspunkt in die Admiralty War Diaries zu die von U168 im Indischen Ozean versenkte kleine Segelschiffe, wird in die AWD für 06/10/43 (fold3.com, micro serial number K-18-D, S. 191) bemerkt...



13. The Panamanian tanker EL SEGUNDO reported on 12 Oct. that at 2100Z today he was missed by 2 torpedoes in 24.11 N. 587.20 E. The master did not report the incident by wireless at the time of its occurrence.

2100z am 06/10/43 = 2200 MEZ (MEZ = U-Zeit ab den 4.Oktobere).

2411N-5820E = MF2673

In DUKBOOT steht ein Satz i.B. einen mißlungenen Angriff von U188 auf einen Tanker am Tag, Position und Uhrzeit fast wie dem Angriff auf die EL SEGUNDO im AWD beschrieben ist..


Nummer	Datum	Zeit	Nr.	Bootnr.	Flottille	Kommandant	Pa	Ereignis (FST)	Feit	Referentie	Quadrat
44592	06.10.1943	21u32	1	U188	12	LÜDDEN 'Siegfried'	2	Angriff auf Einzelfahrer	in MF26	mislukte aanval, 4x1t op tanker	MF26

Die EL SEGUNDO wurde von U188 angegriffen, aber ohne Treffer.

In DUKBOOT erhält Satz 44592 der Portugiesische Tanker EL SEGUNDO als Ziel von U188's Angriff.

12.12 C BANFFSHIRE 6749T Br (+ U532, 29/09/43)

Der Admiralty War Diary für den 29/09/43 (fold3.com, micro serial number K-16-D, Seite 986) meldet:



East Indies - Contd.
U/Bs. (Contd.) SS BANFFSHIRE was torpedoed and sunk at 2020Z in 09.26 N. 71.20 E. (about 300 miles west of Cochin).

2020 Z = 2220 DSZ (DSZ = U-Zeit am 29/09/43).

0923N-7120E = LC1234

Es liegt kein KTB von U532 vor für diese Periode.

KTB BdU meldet für den 29/09/43:

III. Reports on the Enemy:

- U 667 reports as follows, summarizing attempt to break through the Straits of Gibraltar.
"Since 24 September, 8 aircraft attacks with bombs, rocket bombs and machine guns warded off. Hits obtained. No radar location made. Return owing to extensive damage."
- Our own aircraft sighted at 1700 in CF 6689, a convoy consisting of 31 merchant vessels, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 escorts, course N. speed 7 knots.
- 1) Enemy units were located in BF 4120, BF 4450, CG 7330.
2) Report of torpedoing from LC 1224 (U 532?).
- None.

BdU vermutet U532 torpedierte ein Schiff am 29/09/43 in LC1224, nur etwa 17 Seemeilen entfernt von die AWD-Position. Der Satz in DUKBOOT zu diesem Ereignis, die Torpedierung der BANFFSHIRE durch U532, erhält als Zeit 22u20 (DSZ).

12.13 C MEADCLIFFE HALL 1895T Can (U165, 05/09/42)

Dieses Schiff wird weder erwähnt in ASS, noch in uboat.net oder bei ubootarchiv.de.


Es wird nicht erwähnt in Clay Blair's books, und auch nicht in "The official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the 2nd. World War" (W.A.B.Douglas et al).

Michael L.Hadley in sein "U-boats against Canada" (publiziert 1985) brachte uns auf die Spur dieses Dampfers, einen Canadische 'pulpwood freighter'. Hadley erwähnt auf S.116 seines Buches... "**U165 had by this time penetrated the southern portion of the Gulf to the western shore of Cape Breton Island, where on 5 September (1942) it failed in its attack on the lone 1895-ton Canadian cargo ship SS MEADCLIFFE HALL off Chéticamp**".

Hadley gibt an viele Stellen Referenzen für die verwendete Quellen, aber es gibt keine zu obigen Paragraphen.

U513 und U517 operierten im gleichem Seeraum, kehrten zurück von der Feindfahrt. Laut die Angaben in ihr KTB kommen sie nicht in Frage für den Angriff auf die MEADCLIFFE HALL. Nur U165 war auch noch in die Gegend.

Chéticamp liegt in 46°37'57.4"N 61°02'38.3"W = BB4696



Bei die Suche nach weitere Angaben zu diesem (erfolgslosen Angriff) fanden sich im Internet:

<chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiefnlddaccbfmadadm/https://canton-de-cloridorme.com/v2/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Torpedo-of-Saint-Yvon.pdf> ;

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/museenavaldequebec/4435338372> (enthalt Referenzen zu Aktenmaterial); und

<https://lirelamer.com/meteo-et-informations-maritimes/> - Info von der 'premier maître' der MEADCLIFFE HALL.

« Dans l'après-midi, je prends mon quart comme d'habitude, vers midi un quart, et vers deux heures et cinq, au large de Saint-Yvon, dépassé Cap Desrosiers, je commençais à m'éloigner de la côte un peu, parce que la côte je la connaissais bien, et puis une torpille a sorti de l'eau à un mille de nous autres. Elle avait été mal tirée, naturellement, et puis elle a flotté au-dessus de la mer en venant dans notre direction. Naturellement, j'ai crié très fort à l'homme de roue : « tout à gauche ! » et elle est passée vingt pieds de nous autres et elle est allée s'écraser à terre, à Saint-Yvon. »

Aus die Internet-Berichte geht hervor U165 feuerte einen Torpedo auf die MEADCLIFFE HALL, fehlte, und der Torpedo explodierte auf die Küste bei Saint-Yvon (siehe Karte - 49°09'50.2"N 64°47'33.1"W = BB1722).



Die Erklärungen (siehe internet-Seiten) und vor allem der bei Saint-Yvon an Land gelaufenen und explodierten Deutschen Torpedo, machen wir **dokumentieren in DUIKBOOT: U165 griff am 05/09/42 erfolglos der C MEADCLIFFE HALL 1895T an mit einem Torpedo bei Saint-Yvon (BB1722).**

Die Erklärung vom premier maître nach war der Angriff kurz nach 1405 (lokaler Zeit?).

in 64°W gibt es ein Zeitunterschied von 4 Stunden mit GMT, 1405 lokal = 1805 GMT = 2005 DSZ.

In DUIKBOOT ändern wir den Angriffszeit auf die MEADCLIFFE HALL in 20u05 (DSZ).